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<\/a><\/p>\nLa politique ult\u00e9rieure de la Russie envers la G\u00e9orgie est rest\u00e9e plut\u00f4t hostile m\u00eame sous l’administration de Boris Eltsine. Cependant, apr\u00e8s que Vladimir Poutine soit devenu Premier ministre de la Russie en ao\u00fbt 1999, puis pr\u00e9sident au printemps 2000, la situation de la G\u00e9orgie s’est encore d\u00e9t\u00e9rior\u00e9e.<\/h3>\nIl est maintenant important d’examiner comment les autorit\u00e9s g\u00e9orgiennes de l’\u00e9poque ont essay\u00e9, par tous les moyens possibles, d’arr\u00eater le conflit. Tout comme le mouvement national abkhaze \u00e9tait soutenu par le gouvernement russe, le mouvement national oss\u00e8te l’\u00e9tait \u00e9galement. Cependant, contrairement aux Abkhazes, le mouvement national oss\u00e8te en G\u00e9orgie durant les ann\u00e9es 1980 et 1990 avait pour objectif la cr\u00e9ation de son propre \u00c9tat sur le territoire g\u00e9orgien, par la s\u00e9cession d’une partie de celui-ci. Cet objectif du mouvement national oss\u00e8te n’avait ni fondement l\u00e9gal, ni historique, ni aucune autre l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9. D\u00e8s le d\u00e9part, le mouvement national oss\u00e8te a pris la forme et le caract\u00e8re d’un expansionnisme et d’un nationalisme expansionniste.<\/h3>\nLe nationalisme expansionniste oss\u00e8te a \u00e9t\u00e9 renforc\u00e9 par l’imp\u00e9rialisme traditionnel de la Russie, qui continuait de fonctionner au sein de la nouvelle entit\u00e9 \u00e9tatique, la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie. Dans les mains de la Russie, l’expansionnisme oss\u00e8te est devenu un instrument commode, dirig\u00e9 contre la G\u00e9orgie, qui aspirait \u00e0 l’ind\u00e9pendance et \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9.<\/h3>\nDans ce contexte, les relations g\u00e9orgiennes-oss\u00e8tes se sont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es selon un sc\u00e9nario fa\u00e7onn\u00e9 durant le r\u00e8gne de Shevardnadze. C’est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment peu apr\u00e8s l’arriv\u00e9e de Shevardnadze en G\u00e9orgie que, le 29 mai 1992, un acte a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9 \u00e0 Tskhinvali proclamant l’\u00ab ind\u00e9pendance de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb, et le nouveau gouvernement g\u00e9orgien s’est retrouv\u00e9 confront\u00e9 \u00e0 une nouvelle r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Cela a \u00e9t\u00e9 suivi, le 24 juin 1992 \u00e0 Dagomys (pr\u00e8s de Sotchi), par une rencontre entre Boris Eltsine et Eduard Shevardnadze, o\u00f9 un accord a \u00e9t\u00e9 sign\u00e9 sur les principes de r\u00e8glement du conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te.<\/h3>\nShevardnadze lui-m\u00eame d\u00e9clare dans ses m\u00e9moires : \u00ab Le r\u00e9sultat de notre r\u00e9union fut un accord sur les principes de r\u00e8glement du conflit et un communiqu\u00e9, qui d\u00e9clarait que la G\u00e9orgie et la Russie \u00ab\u00a0reconnaissent la souverainet\u00e9 et l’ind\u00e9pendance, l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale et l’inviolabilit\u00e9 des fronti\u00e8res de chacun. Elles n’ont aucune revendication territoriale l’une contre l’autre et s’engagent publiquement \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre et \u00e0 r\u00e9gler tout diff\u00e9rend pouvant survenir exclusivement par des moyens pacifiques, par des n\u00e9gociations politiques, et \u00e0 s’abstenir de recourir \u00e0 la force.\u00a0\u00bb \u00bb<\/em><\/h3>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/revuedestemps.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/ardzinba_yeltsin_shevardnadze_moscow_agreement-300x162.jpg\")
<\/a><\/p>\nL’accord pr\u00e9voyait les conditions suivantes : un cessez-le-feu ; le retrait des formations arm\u00e9es de la zone de conflit ; la cr\u00e9ation d’une Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe ; et l’\u00e9tablissement d’un groupe d’observateurs militaires avec la participation des parties. Il a ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que la Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe servirait de corps permanent impliquant les quatre parties dans le processus de r\u00e8glement du conflit. Celles-ci incluaient des repr\u00e9sentants de la G\u00e9orgie, de la Russie, de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Nord et de l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb.<\/h3>\nIl \u00e9tait particuli\u00e8rement important de noter que l’Organisation pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et la coop\u00e9ration en Europe (OSCE) \u00e9tait incluse dans le processus de n\u00e9gociation. Cette organisation a tent\u00e9 de faire passer les n\u00e9gociations des questions \u00e9conomiques aux accords politiques, en tenant compte de l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale de la G\u00e9orgie et du principe de l’inviolabilit\u00e9 de ses fronti\u00e8res. La Russie, cependant, cherchait \u00e0 limiter le r\u00f4le de l’OSCE dans ce processus.<\/h3>\nN\u00e9anmoins, la participation de celle-ci aux n\u00e9gociations du conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te a produit certains r\u00e9sultats temporaires. Au d\u00e9but de 2001, une r\u00e9solution du Parlement europ\u00e9en a not\u00e9 que l’Abkhazie et l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb existaient en dehors de la juridiction de facto de la G\u00e9orgie. Malgr\u00e9 cela, l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9voluait vers la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de la G\u00e9orgie. En avril 2001, une constitution a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e, selon laquelle l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9tait d\u00e9finie comme un \u00c9tat souverain. Cette constitution lui conf\u00e9rait le droit de rejoindre un autre \u00c9tat, \u00e0 savoir la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, permettant ainsi l’annexion du territoire historique de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 la Russie.<\/h3>\nPour cette raison, le mouvement s\u00e9paratiste oss\u00e8te et sa volont\u00e9 d’ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9taient de nature expansionniste.<\/h3>\nMalheureusement, comme toujours, aucun accord avec la Russie n’a jamais fonctionn\u00e9, et il ne peut jamais fonctionner. Tout accord, t\u00f4t ou tard, se termine par une trahison de la part de la Russie. Le conflit n’est rest\u00e9 gel\u00e9 que jusqu’en 2008. Cependant, le 7 ao\u00fbt 2008, la Russie a lanc\u00e9 une guerre contre la G\u00e9orgie.<\/h3>\nLe conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te des ann\u00e9es 1990 d\u00e9montre clairement l’asym\u00e9trie structurelle entre un petit \u00c9tat aspirant \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9 et un pouvoir r\u00e9gional guid\u00e9 par les traditions imp\u00e9rialistes. Malgr\u00e9 les tentatives g\u00e9orgiennes de mettre fin \u00e0 l\u2019escalade par la n\u00e9gociation, les accords de paix et l\u2019implication d\u2019acteurs internationaux comme l\u2019OSCE, le processus est rest\u00e9 l\u2019otage des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques de la Russie. L\u2019instrumentalisation constante par Moscou des mouvements s\u00e9paratistes en Abkhazie et en Oss\u00e9tie du Sud a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 que les accords n\u2019ont jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 con\u00e7us pour assurer la paix, mais plut\u00f4t pour geler les conflits d\u2019une mani\u00e8re avantageuse pour la Russie. La stabilit\u00e9 temporaire qui a \u00e9merg\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l’Accord de Dagomys de 1992 n’a fait que retarder une nouvelle vague d’agression, qui a culmin\u00e9 avec la guerre d’ao\u00fbt 2008. Nous pouvons rapprocher ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements avec le processus d\u2019un propable cessez-le-feu entre l\u2019Ukraine et la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie.<\/h3>\nD’un point de vue analytique, l’affaire met en lumi\u00e8re deux enseignements cl\u00e9s. Premi\u00e8rement, les accords de paix n\u00e9goci\u00e9s sans m\u00e9canismes d’application cr\u00e9dibles et sans engagement v\u00e9ritable de toutes les parties ne peuvent pas assurer une stabilit\u00e9 durable. Deuxi\u00e8mement, le recours par la Russie \u00e0 des entit\u00e9s s\u00e9paratistes en tant qu\u2019outils g\u00e9opolitiques d\u00e9montre la continuit\u00e9 de sa politique expansionniste, rendant tout accord n\u00e9goci\u00e9 intrins\u00e8quement fragile. Pour la G\u00e9orgie, l’exp\u00e9rience a soulign\u00e9 la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un engagement international plus large et les risques d’isolement diplomatique. En fin de compte, l’exp\u00e9rience g\u00e9orgienne des ann\u00e9es 1990 et 2000 reste un exemple significatif de la fa\u00e7on dont les conflits non r\u00e9solus, sous l’ombre d’une grande ing\u00e9rence des puissances, peuvent \u00e9voluer vers une guerre ouverte.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/a><\/h3>\n\n- \n
Batiashvili, Davit. August 7: How Russia Prepared and Started the 2008 War Against Georgia.<\/em> 2018.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Bluashvili, Ucha. History of Georgia, 1900\u20132016.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMtsignobari\u201d Publishing, 2016.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Nadirazde, Eldar. Georgia \u2013 The Country of One Hundred Men: Letters.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cIntelecti\u201d Publishing, 2001.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Natmeladze, Maqvala & Daushvili, Aleksandre. Modern History of Georgia (1921\u20132000).<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMematiane\u201d Publishing, 2004.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Papaskhiri, Zurab. Essays from the Historical Past of Contemporary Abkhazia, Volume II: 1917\u20131993.<\/em> Tbilisi: Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Sokhumi Branch, 2007.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shevardnadze, Eduard. Thoughts on the Past and the Future: Memoirs.<\/em> Tbilisi: Palitra L, 2006.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Path Toward the West: Collected Publications.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cUniversali\u201d Publishing, 2012.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Modern History of Georgia (1917\u20132012).<\/em> Tbilisi: Meridiani Publishing, 2021.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\nVersion anglaise (english version) :<\/h3>\nThe Treaty of Sochi (1992): How Georgia Accepted a Frozen Conflict<\/strong><\/h3>\nAt the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet and later the Russian security services acted in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in almost the same way as they did in Ukraine\u2019s Donbas region in 2014. Local separatists were mobilized and supported, and later their actions were given direction. When this was not sufficient to achieve the intended goals, Russia intervened in the conflict more directly.<\/h3>\nAs a result, almost the whole of Abkhazia and a large part of the Tskhinvali region came under indirect Russian control through the mediation of Moscow-backed separatists. Meanwhile, the majority of the ethnically Georgian population of Abkhazia was forced to leave their native region as a consequence of ethnic cleansing. In the early 1990s, Georgia was far more diplomatically isolated than today\u2019s Ukraine.<\/h3>\nBecause of this, Russia managed to impose its will and ensure the presence of Russian peacekeepers in both regions. In Abkhazia, the entire peacekeeping contingent was made up of Russian soldiers. In the Tskhinvali region, a more mixed peacekeeping format was introduced, which included three battalions: one from Russia\u2019s regular armed forces, the second formally representing South Ossetia-Alania, and the third from Georgia\u2019s armed forces.<\/h3>\nRussia\u2019s subsequent policy toward Georgia remained quite unfriendly even during Boris Yeltsin\u2019s administration. However, after Vladimir Putin became Russia\u2019s prime minister in August 1999, and then president in the spring of 2000, Georgia\u2019s situation worsened even further.<\/h3>\nBut now it is important for us to examine the question of how the Georgian authorities at the time tried, in any way possible, to halt the conflict. Just as the Abkhaz national movement was supported by the Russian government, so too was the Ossetian national movement. However, unlike the Abkhazians, the Ossetian national movement in Georgia during the 1980s\u20131990s ultimately set as its goal the creation of its own state on Georgian territory, through the secession of a part of it. Such an objective of the Ossetian national movement had neither legal, nor historical, nor any other legitimate foundation or justification. From the very beginning, the Ossetian national movement assumed the essence and character of expansionism and expansionist nationalism.<\/h3>\nOssetian expansionist nationalism was reinforced by Russia\u2019s traditional imperialism, which continued to function within the newly established state, the Russian Federation. In Russia\u2019s hands, Ossetian expansionism served as a convenient instrument, directed against Georgia, which was striving for independence and sovereignty.<\/h3>\nAgainst this background, Georgian-Ossetian relations developed according to a scenario shaped during Shevardnadze\u2019s rule. It was precisely in the period shortly after Shevardnadze\u2019s arrival in Georgia that, on 29 May 1992, an act was adopted in Tskhinvali proclaiming the \u201cindependence of South Ossetia,\u201d and Georgia\u2019s new government found itself facing a new reality. This was soon followed, on 24 June 1992 in Dagomys (near Sochi), by a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, where an agreement was signed on the principles of regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.<\/h3>\nShevardnadze himself states in his memoirs: \u201cThe result of our meeting was an agreement on the principles of conflict regulation and a communiqu\u00e9, which declared that Georgia and Russia \u2018recognize each other\u2019s sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They have no territorial claims against one another and undertake public commitments to resolve and regulate any disputes that may arise exclusively by peaceful means, through political negotiations, and to refrain from the use of force.\u2019\u201d<\/h3>\nThe agreement envisaged the following conditions: a ceasefire; the withdrawal of armed formations from the conflict zone; the creation of a Joint Control Commission; and the establishment of a group of military observers with the participation of the parties. It was later specified that the Joint Control Commission would serve as a permanent body involving the four parties in the process of conflict regulation. These included representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, and \u201cSouth Ossetia.\u201d<\/h3>\nOf particular importance was the fact that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was included in the negotiation process. This organization attempted to move the negotiations from economic issues to political agreements\u2014taking into account Georgia\u2019s territorial integrity and the principle of the inviolability of its borders. Russia, however, sought to limit the role of the OSCE in this process.<\/h3>\nNevertheless, OSCE participation in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict negotiations produced certain temporary results. At the beginning of 2001, a resolution of the European Parliament noted that Abkhazia and \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d existed outside Georgia\u2019s de facto jurisdiction. Despite this, \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was evolving toward disintegration from Georgia. In April 2001, a constitution was adopted, according to which \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was defined as a sovereign state. This constitution granted it the right to join another state namely, the Russian Federation thus allowing Georgia\u2019s historical territory to be annexed to Russia.<\/h3>\nFor this reason, the Ossetian separatist movement and its drive toward independence were of an expansionist nature.<\/h3>\nUnfortunately, as always, no agreement with Russia has ever worked, nor can it ever work. Any agreement, sooner or later, ends in betrayal on Russia\u2019s part. The conflict remained frozen only until 2008. On 7 August 2008, however, Russia launched a war against Georgia.<\/h3>\nThe Georgian-Ossetian conflict of the 1990s clearly demonstrates the structural asymmetry between a small state striving for sovereignty and a regional power guided by imperialist traditions. Despite Georgia\u2019s attempts to halt the escalation through negotiations, peace agreements, and the involvement of international actors such as the OSCE, the process remained hostage to Russia\u2019s strategic interests. Moscow\u2019s consistent instrumentalization of separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia revealed that agreements were never designed to secure peace, but rather to freeze conflicts in ways advantageous to Russia. The temporary stability that emerged after the 1992 Dagomys Agreement only postponed a new wave of aggression, which culminated in the war of August 2008.<\/h3>\nFrom an analytical perspective, the case highlights two key lessons. First, peace agreements brokered without credible enforcement mechanisms and without genuine commitment from all sides cannot provide lasting stability. Second, Russia\u2019s use of separatist entities as geopolitical tools demonstrates the continuity of its expansionist policy, making any negotiated settlement inherently fragile. For Georgia, the experience underscored the necessity of broader international engagement and the risks of diplomatic isolation. Ultimately, the Georgian experience of the 1990s and 2000s remains a significant example of how unresolved conflicts, under the shadow of great power interference, can evolve into open war.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/h3>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, les services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sovi\u00e9tiques, puis russes, ont agi en Abkhazie et dans la r\u00e9gion de Tskhinvali de mani\u00e8re presque identique \u00e0 celle qu’ils ont adopt\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9gion du Donbass en Ukraine en 2014. Des s\u00e9paratistes locaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mobilis\u00e9s et soutenus, et plus tard, leurs actions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":27,"featured_media":4080,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17,1,16],"tags":[48],"class_list":["post-4071","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-histoire","category-non-classe","category-politique","tag-septembre-2025"],"yoast_head":"\n
Le trait\u00e9 de Sotchi (1992) : Comment la G\u00e9orgie a accept\u00e9 un conflit gel\u00e9. - Revue des Temps<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revuedestemps.com\/index.php\/2025\/09\/14\/le-traite-de-sotchi-1992-comment-la-georgie-a-accepte-un-conflit-gele\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Le trait\u00e9 de Sotchi (1992) : Comment la G\u00e9orgie a accept\u00e9 un conflit gel\u00e9. - Revue des Temps\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, les services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sovi\u00e9tiques, puis russes, ont agi en Abkhazie et dans la r\u00e9gion de Tskhinvali de mani\u00e8re presque identique \u00e0 celle qu’ils ont adopt\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9gion du Donbass en Ukraine en 2014. 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Le nationalisme expansionniste oss\u00e8te a \u00e9t\u00e9 renforc\u00e9 par l’imp\u00e9rialisme traditionnel de la Russie, qui continuait de fonctionner au sein de la nouvelle entit\u00e9 \u00e9tatique, la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie. Dans les mains de la Russie, l’expansionnisme oss\u00e8te est devenu un instrument commode, dirig\u00e9 contre la G\u00e9orgie, qui aspirait \u00e0 l’ind\u00e9pendance et \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9.<\/h3>\nDans ce contexte, les relations g\u00e9orgiennes-oss\u00e8tes se sont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es selon un sc\u00e9nario fa\u00e7onn\u00e9 durant le r\u00e8gne de Shevardnadze. C’est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment peu apr\u00e8s l’arriv\u00e9e de Shevardnadze en G\u00e9orgie que, le 29 mai 1992, un acte a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9 \u00e0 Tskhinvali proclamant l’\u00ab ind\u00e9pendance de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb, et le nouveau gouvernement g\u00e9orgien s’est retrouv\u00e9 confront\u00e9 \u00e0 une nouvelle r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Cela a \u00e9t\u00e9 suivi, le 24 juin 1992 \u00e0 Dagomys (pr\u00e8s de Sotchi), par une rencontre entre Boris Eltsine et Eduard Shevardnadze, o\u00f9 un accord a \u00e9t\u00e9 sign\u00e9 sur les principes de r\u00e8glement du conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te.<\/h3>\nShevardnadze lui-m\u00eame d\u00e9clare dans ses m\u00e9moires : \u00ab Le r\u00e9sultat de notre r\u00e9union fut un accord sur les principes de r\u00e8glement du conflit et un communiqu\u00e9, qui d\u00e9clarait que la G\u00e9orgie et la Russie \u00ab\u00a0reconnaissent la souverainet\u00e9 et l’ind\u00e9pendance, l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale et l’inviolabilit\u00e9 des fronti\u00e8res de chacun. Elles n’ont aucune revendication territoriale l’une contre l’autre et s’engagent publiquement \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre et \u00e0 r\u00e9gler tout diff\u00e9rend pouvant survenir exclusivement par des moyens pacifiques, par des n\u00e9gociations politiques, et \u00e0 s’abstenir de recourir \u00e0 la force.\u00a0\u00bb \u00bb<\/em><\/h3>\n<\/a><\/p>\nL’accord pr\u00e9voyait les conditions suivantes : un cessez-le-feu ; le retrait des formations arm\u00e9es de la zone de conflit ; la cr\u00e9ation d’une Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe ; et l’\u00e9tablissement d’un groupe d’observateurs militaires avec la participation des parties. Il a ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que la Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe servirait de corps permanent impliquant les quatre parties dans le processus de r\u00e8glement du conflit. Celles-ci incluaient des repr\u00e9sentants de la G\u00e9orgie, de la Russie, de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Nord et de l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb.<\/h3>\nIl \u00e9tait particuli\u00e8rement important de noter que l’Organisation pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et la coop\u00e9ration en Europe (OSCE) \u00e9tait incluse dans le processus de n\u00e9gociation. Cette organisation a tent\u00e9 de faire passer les n\u00e9gociations des questions \u00e9conomiques aux accords politiques, en tenant compte de l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale de la G\u00e9orgie et du principe de l’inviolabilit\u00e9 de ses fronti\u00e8res. La Russie, cependant, cherchait \u00e0 limiter le r\u00f4le de l’OSCE dans ce processus.<\/h3>\nN\u00e9anmoins, la participation de celle-ci aux n\u00e9gociations du conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te a produit certains r\u00e9sultats temporaires. Au d\u00e9but de 2001, une r\u00e9solution du Parlement europ\u00e9en a not\u00e9 que l’Abkhazie et l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb existaient en dehors de la juridiction de facto de la G\u00e9orgie. Malgr\u00e9 cela, l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9voluait vers la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de la G\u00e9orgie. En avril 2001, une constitution a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e, selon laquelle l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9tait d\u00e9finie comme un \u00c9tat souverain. Cette constitution lui conf\u00e9rait le droit de rejoindre un autre \u00c9tat, \u00e0 savoir la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, permettant ainsi l’annexion du territoire historique de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 la Russie.<\/h3>\nPour cette raison, le mouvement s\u00e9paratiste oss\u00e8te et sa volont\u00e9 d’ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9taient de nature expansionniste.<\/h3>\nMalheureusement, comme toujours, aucun accord avec la Russie n’a jamais fonctionn\u00e9, et il ne peut jamais fonctionner. Tout accord, t\u00f4t ou tard, se termine par une trahison de la part de la Russie. Le conflit n’est rest\u00e9 gel\u00e9 que jusqu’en 2008. Cependant, le 7 ao\u00fbt 2008, la Russie a lanc\u00e9 une guerre contre la G\u00e9orgie.<\/h3>\nLe conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te des ann\u00e9es 1990 d\u00e9montre clairement l’asym\u00e9trie structurelle entre un petit \u00c9tat aspirant \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9 et un pouvoir r\u00e9gional guid\u00e9 par les traditions imp\u00e9rialistes. Malgr\u00e9 les tentatives g\u00e9orgiennes de mettre fin \u00e0 l\u2019escalade par la n\u00e9gociation, les accords de paix et l\u2019implication d\u2019acteurs internationaux comme l\u2019OSCE, le processus est rest\u00e9 l\u2019otage des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques de la Russie. L\u2019instrumentalisation constante par Moscou des mouvements s\u00e9paratistes en Abkhazie et en Oss\u00e9tie du Sud a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 que les accords n\u2019ont jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 con\u00e7us pour assurer la paix, mais plut\u00f4t pour geler les conflits d\u2019une mani\u00e8re avantageuse pour la Russie. La stabilit\u00e9 temporaire qui a \u00e9merg\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l’Accord de Dagomys de 1992 n’a fait que retarder une nouvelle vague d’agression, qui a culmin\u00e9 avec la guerre d’ao\u00fbt 2008. Nous pouvons rapprocher ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements avec le processus d\u2019un propable cessez-le-feu entre l\u2019Ukraine et la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie.<\/h3>\nD’un point de vue analytique, l’affaire met en lumi\u00e8re deux enseignements cl\u00e9s. Premi\u00e8rement, les accords de paix n\u00e9goci\u00e9s sans m\u00e9canismes d’application cr\u00e9dibles et sans engagement v\u00e9ritable de toutes les parties ne peuvent pas assurer une stabilit\u00e9 durable. Deuxi\u00e8mement, le recours par la Russie \u00e0 des entit\u00e9s s\u00e9paratistes en tant qu\u2019outils g\u00e9opolitiques d\u00e9montre la continuit\u00e9 de sa politique expansionniste, rendant tout accord n\u00e9goci\u00e9 intrins\u00e8quement fragile. Pour la G\u00e9orgie, l’exp\u00e9rience a soulign\u00e9 la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un engagement international plus large et les risques d’isolement diplomatique. En fin de compte, l’exp\u00e9rience g\u00e9orgienne des ann\u00e9es 1990 et 2000 reste un exemple significatif de la fa\u00e7on dont les conflits non r\u00e9solus, sous l’ombre d’une grande ing\u00e9rence des puissances, peuvent \u00e9voluer vers une guerre ouverte.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/a><\/h3>\n\n- \n
Batiashvili, Davit. August 7: How Russia Prepared and Started the 2008 War Against Georgia.<\/em> 2018.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Bluashvili, Ucha. History of Georgia, 1900\u20132016.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMtsignobari\u201d Publishing, 2016.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Nadirazde, Eldar. Georgia \u2013 The Country of One Hundred Men: Letters.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cIntelecti\u201d Publishing, 2001.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Natmeladze, Maqvala & Daushvili, Aleksandre. Modern History of Georgia (1921\u20132000).<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMematiane\u201d Publishing, 2004.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Papaskhiri, Zurab. Essays from the Historical Past of Contemporary Abkhazia, Volume II: 1917\u20131993.<\/em> Tbilisi: Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Sokhumi Branch, 2007.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shevardnadze, Eduard. Thoughts on the Past and the Future: Memoirs.<\/em> Tbilisi: Palitra L, 2006.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Path Toward the West: Collected Publications.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cUniversali\u201d Publishing, 2012.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Modern History of Georgia (1917\u20132012).<\/em> Tbilisi: Meridiani Publishing, 2021.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\nVersion anglaise (english version) :<\/h3>\nThe Treaty of Sochi (1992): How Georgia Accepted a Frozen Conflict<\/strong><\/h3>\nAt the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet and later the Russian security services acted in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in almost the same way as they did in Ukraine\u2019s Donbas region in 2014. Local separatists were mobilized and supported, and later their actions were given direction. When this was not sufficient to achieve the intended goals, Russia intervened in the conflict more directly.<\/h3>\nAs a result, almost the whole of Abkhazia and a large part of the Tskhinvali region came under indirect Russian control through the mediation of Moscow-backed separatists. Meanwhile, the majority of the ethnically Georgian population of Abkhazia was forced to leave their native region as a consequence of ethnic cleansing. In the early 1990s, Georgia was far more diplomatically isolated than today\u2019s Ukraine.<\/h3>\nBecause of this, Russia managed to impose its will and ensure the presence of Russian peacekeepers in both regions. In Abkhazia, the entire peacekeeping contingent was made up of Russian soldiers. In the Tskhinvali region, a more mixed peacekeeping format was introduced, which included three battalions: one from Russia\u2019s regular armed forces, the second formally representing South Ossetia-Alania, and the third from Georgia\u2019s armed forces.<\/h3>\nRussia\u2019s subsequent policy toward Georgia remained quite unfriendly even during Boris Yeltsin\u2019s administration. However, after Vladimir Putin became Russia\u2019s prime minister in August 1999, and then president in the spring of 2000, Georgia\u2019s situation worsened even further.<\/h3>\nBut now it is important for us to examine the question of how the Georgian authorities at the time tried, in any way possible, to halt the conflict. Just as the Abkhaz national movement was supported by the Russian government, so too was the Ossetian national movement. However, unlike the Abkhazians, the Ossetian national movement in Georgia during the 1980s\u20131990s ultimately set as its goal the creation of its own state on Georgian territory, through the secession of a part of it. Such an objective of the Ossetian national movement had neither legal, nor historical, nor any other legitimate foundation or justification. From the very beginning, the Ossetian national movement assumed the essence and character of expansionism and expansionist nationalism.<\/h3>\nOssetian expansionist nationalism was reinforced by Russia\u2019s traditional imperialism, which continued to function within the newly established state, the Russian Federation. In Russia\u2019s hands, Ossetian expansionism served as a convenient instrument, directed against Georgia, which was striving for independence and sovereignty.<\/h3>\nAgainst this background, Georgian-Ossetian relations developed according to a scenario shaped during Shevardnadze\u2019s rule. It was precisely in the period shortly after Shevardnadze\u2019s arrival in Georgia that, on 29 May 1992, an act was adopted in Tskhinvali proclaiming the \u201cindependence of South Ossetia,\u201d and Georgia\u2019s new government found itself facing a new reality. This was soon followed, on 24 June 1992 in Dagomys (near Sochi), by a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, where an agreement was signed on the principles of regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.<\/h3>\nShevardnadze himself states in his memoirs: \u201cThe result of our meeting was an agreement on the principles of conflict regulation and a communiqu\u00e9, which declared that Georgia and Russia \u2018recognize each other\u2019s sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They have no territorial claims against one another and undertake public commitments to resolve and regulate any disputes that may arise exclusively by peaceful means, through political negotiations, and to refrain from the use of force.\u2019\u201d<\/h3>\nThe agreement envisaged the following conditions: a ceasefire; the withdrawal of armed formations from the conflict zone; the creation of a Joint Control Commission; and the establishment of a group of military observers with the participation of the parties. It was later specified that the Joint Control Commission would serve as a permanent body involving the four parties in the process of conflict regulation. These included representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, and \u201cSouth Ossetia.\u201d<\/h3>\nOf particular importance was the fact that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was included in the negotiation process. This organization attempted to move the negotiations from economic issues to political agreements\u2014taking into account Georgia\u2019s territorial integrity and the principle of the inviolability of its borders. Russia, however, sought to limit the role of the OSCE in this process.<\/h3>\nNevertheless, OSCE participation in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict negotiations produced certain temporary results. At the beginning of 2001, a resolution of the European Parliament noted that Abkhazia and \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d existed outside Georgia\u2019s de facto jurisdiction. Despite this, \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was evolving toward disintegration from Georgia. In April 2001, a constitution was adopted, according to which \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was defined as a sovereign state. This constitution granted it the right to join another state namely, the Russian Federation thus allowing Georgia\u2019s historical territory to be annexed to Russia.<\/h3>\nFor this reason, the Ossetian separatist movement and its drive toward independence were of an expansionist nature.<\/h3>\nUnfortunately, as always, no agreement with Russia has ever worked, nor can it ever work. Any agreement, sooner or later, ends in betrayal on Russia\u2019s part. The conflict remained frozen only until 2008. On 7 August 2008, however, Russia launched a war against Georgia.<\/h3>\nThe Georgian-Ossetian conflict of the 1990s clearly demonstrates the structural asymmetry between a small state striving for sovereignty and a regional power guided by imperialist traditions. Despite Georgia\u2019s attempts to halt the escalation through negotiations, peace agreements, and the involvement of international actors such as the OSCE, the process remained hostage to Russia\u2019s strategic interests. Moscow\u2019s consistent instrumentalization of separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia revealed that agreements were never designed to secure peace, but rather to freeze conflicts in ways advantageous to Russia. The temporary stability that emerged after the 1992 Dagomys Agreement only postponed a new wave of aggression, which culminated in the war of August 2008.<\/h3>\nFrom an analytical perspective, the case highlights two key lessons. First, peace agreements brokered without credible enforcement mechanisms and without genuine commitment from all sides cannot provide lasting stability. Second, Russia\u2019s use of separatist entities as geopolitical tools demonstrates the continuity of its expansionist policy, making any negotiated settlement inherently fragile. For Georgia, the experience underscored the necessity of broader international engagement and the risks of diplomatic isolation. Ultimately, the Georgian experience of the 1990s and 2000s remains a significant example of how unresolved conflicts, under the shadow of great power interference, can evolve into open war.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/h3>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, les services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sovi\u00e9tiques, puis russes, ont agi en Abkhazie et dans la r\u00e9gion de Tskhinvali de mani\u00e8re presque identique \u00e0 celle qu’ils ont adopt\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9gion du Donbass en Ukraine en 2014. Des s\u00e9paratistes locaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mobilis\u00e9s et soutenus, et plus tard, leurs actions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":27,"featured_media":4080,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17,1,16],"tags":[48],"class_list":["post-4071","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-histoire","category-non-classe","category-politique","tag-septembre-2025"],"yoast_head":"\n
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Shevardnadze lui-m\u00eame d\u00e9clare dans ses m\u00e9moires : \u00ab Le r\u00e9sultat de notre r\u00e9union fut un accord sur les principes de r\u00e8glement du conflit et un communiqu\u00e9, qui d\u00e9clarait que la G\u00e9orgie et la Russie \u00ab\u00a0reconnaissent la souverainet\u00e9 et l’ind\u00e9pendance, l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale et l’inviolabilit\u00e9 des fronti\u00e8res de chacun. Elles n’ont aucune revendication territoriale l’une contre l’autre et s’engagent publiquement \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre et \u00e0 r\u00e9gler tout diff\u00e9rend pouvant survenir exclusivement par des moyens pacifiques, par des n\u00e9gociations politiques, et \u00e0 s’abstenir de recourir \u00e0 la force.\u00a0\u00bb \u00bb<\/em><\/h3>\n<\/a><\/p>\nL’accord pr\u00e9voyait les conditions suivantes : un cessez-le-feu ; le retrait des formations arm\u00e9es de la zone de conflit ; la cr\u00e9ation d’une Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe ; et l’\u00e9tablissement d’un groupe d’observateurs militaires avec la participation des parties. Il a ensuite \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que la Commission de Contr\u00f4le Conjointe servirait de corps permanent impliquant les quatre parties dans le processus de r\u00e8glement du conflit. Celles-ci incluaient des repr\u00e9sentants de la G\u00e9orgie, de la Russie, de l’Oss\u00e9tie du Nord et de l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb.<\/h3>\nIl \u00e9tait particuli\u00e8rement important de noter que l’Organisation pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et la coop\u00e9ration en Europe (OSCE) \u00e9tait incluse dans le processus de n\u00e9gociation. Cette organisation a tent\u00e9 de faire passer les n\u00e9gociations des questions \u00e9conomiques aux accords politiques, en tenant compte de l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 territoriale de la G\u00e9orgie et du principe de l’inviolabilit\u00e9 de ses fronti\u00e8res. La Russie, cependant, cherchait \u00e0 limiter le r\u00f4le de l’OSCE dans ce processus.<\/h3>\nN\u00e9anmoins, la participation de celle-ci aux n\u00e9gociations du conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te a produit certains r\u00e9sultats temporaires. Au d\u00e9but de 2001, une r\u00e9solution du Parlement europ\u00e9en a not\u00e9 que l’Abkhazie et l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb existaient en dehors de la juridiction de facto de la G\u00e9orgie. Malgr\u00e9 cela, l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9voluait vers la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de la G\u00e9orgie. En avril 2001, une constitution a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e, selon laquelle l’\u00ab Oss\u00e9tie du Sud \u00bb \u00e9tait d\u00e9finie comme un \u00c9tat souverain. Cette constitution lui conf\u00e9rait le droit de rejoindre un autre \u00c9tat, \u00e0 savoir la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie, permettant ainsi l’annexion du territoire historique de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 la Russie.<\/h3>\nPour cette raison, le mouvement s\u00e9paratiste oss\u00e8te et sa volont\u00e9 d’ind\u00e9pendance \u00e9taient de nature expansionniste.<\/h3>\nMalheureusement, comme toujours, aucun accord avec la Russie n’a jamais fonctionn\u00e9, et il ne peut jamais fonctionner. Tout accord, t\u00f4t ou tard, se termine par une trahison de la part de la Russie. Le conflit n’est rest\u00e9 gel\u00e9 que jusqu’en 2008. Cependant, le 7 ao\u00fbt 2008, la Russie a lanc\u00e9 une guerre contre la G\u00e9orgie.<\/h3>\nLe conflit g\u00e9orgien-oss\u00e8te des ann\u00e9es 1990 d\u00e9montre clairement l’asym\u00e9trie structurelle entre un petit \u00c9tat aspirant \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9 et un pouvoir r\u00e9gional guid\u00e9 par les traditions imp\u00e9rialistes. Malgr\u00e9 les tentatives g\u00e9orgiennes de mettre fin \u00e0 l\u2019escalade par la n\u00e9gociation, les accords de paix et l\u2019implication d\u2019acteurs internationaux comme l\u2019OSCE, le processus est rest\u00e9 l\u2019otage des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques de la Russie. L\u2019instrumentalisation constante par Moscou des mouvements s\u00e9paratistes en Abkhazie et en Oss\u00e9tie du Sud a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 que les accords n\u2019ont jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 con\u00e7us pour assurer la paix, mais plut\u00f4t pour geler les conflits d\u2019une mani\u00e8re avantageuse pour la Russie. La stabilit\u00e9 temporaire qui a \u00e9merg\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l’Accord de Dagomys de 1992 n’a fait que retarder une nouvelle vague d’agression, qui a culmin\u00e9 avec la guerre d’ao\u00fbt 2008. Nous pouvons rapprocher ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements avec le processus d\u2019un propable cessez-le-feu entre l\u2019Ukraine et la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie.<\/h3>\nD’un point de vue analytique, l’affaire met en lumi\u00e8re deux enseignements cl\u00e9s. Premi\u00e8rement, les accords de paix n\u00e9goci\u00e9s sans m\u00e9canismes d’application cr\u00e9dibles et sans engagement v\u00e9ritable de toutes les parties ne peuvent pas assurer une stabilit\u00e9 durable. Deuxi\u00e8mement, le recours par la Russie \u00e0 des entit\u00e9s s\u00e9paratistes en tant qu\u2019outils g\u00e9opolitiques d\u00e9montre la continuit\u00e9 de sa politique expansionniste, rendant tout accord n\u00e9goci\u00e9 intrins\u00e8quement fragile. Pour la G\u00e9orgie, l’exp\u00e9rience a soulign\u00e9 la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un engagement international plus large et les risques d’isolement diplomatique. En fin de compte, l’exp\u00e9rience g\u00e9orgienne des ann\u00e9es 1990 et 2000 reste un exemple significatif de la fa\u00e7on dont les conflits non r\u00e9solus, sous l’ombre d’une grande ing\u00e9rence des puissances, peuvent \u00e9voluer vers une guerre ouverte.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/a><\/h3>\n\n- \n
Batiashvili, Davit. August 7: How Russia Prepared and Started the 2008 War Against Georgia.<\/em> 2018.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Bluashvili, Ucha. History of Georgia, 1900\u20132016.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMtsignobari\u201d Publishing, 2016.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Nadirazde, Eldar. Georgia \u2013 The Country of One Hundred Men: Letters.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cIntelecti\u201d Publishing, 2001.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Natmeladze, Maqvala & Daushvili, Aleksandre. Modern History of Georgia (1921\u20132000).<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cMematiane\u201d Publishing, 2004.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Papaskhiri, Zurab. Essays from the Historical Past of Contemporary Abkhazia, Volume II: 1917\u20131993.<\/em> Tbilisi: Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Sokhumi Branch, 2007.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shevardnadze, Eduard. Thoughts on the Past and the Future: Memoirs.<\/em> Tbilisi: Palitra L, 2006.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Path Toward the West: Collected Publications.<\/em> Tbilisi: \u201cUniversali\u201d Publishing, 2012.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n- \n
Shvelidze, Dimitri. Modern History of Georgia (1917\u20132012).<\/em> Tbilisi: Meridiani Publishing, 2021.<\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\nVersion anglaise (english version) :<\/h3>\nThe Treaty of Sochi (1992): How Georgia Accepted a Frozen Conflict<\/strong><\/h3>\nAt the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet and later the Russian security services acted in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region in almost the same way as they did in Ukraine\u2019s Donbas region in 2014. Local separatists were mobilized and supported, and later their actions were given direction. When this was not sufficient to achieve the intended goals, Russia intervened in the conflict more directly.<\/h3>\nAs a result, almost the whole of Abkhazia and a large part of the Tskhinvali region came under indirect Russian control through the mediation of Moscow-backed separatists. Meanwhile, the majority of the ethnically Georgian population of Abkhazia was forced to leave their native region as a consequence of ethnic cleansing. In the early 1990s, Georgia was far more diplomatically isolated than today\u2019s Ukraine.<\/h3>\nBecause of this, Russia managed to impose its will and ensure the presence of Russian peacekeepers in both regions. In Abkhazia, the entire peacekeeping contingent was made up of Russian soldiers. In the Tskhinvali region, a more mixed peacekeeping format was introduced, which included three battalions: one from Russia\u2019s regular armed forces, the second formally representing South Ossetia-Alania, and the third from Georgia\u2019s armed forces.<\/h3>\nRussia\u2019s subsequent policy toward Georgia remained quite unfriendly even during Boris Yeltsin\u2019s administration. However, after Vladimir Putin became Russia\u2019s prime minister in August 1999, and then president in the spring of 2000, Georgia\u2019s situation worsened even further.<\/h3>\nBut now it is important for us to examine the question of how the Georgian authorities at the time tried, in any way possible, to halt the conflict. Just as the Abkhaz national movement was supported by the Russian government, so too was the Ossetian national movement. However, unlike the Abkhazians, the Ossetian national movement in Georgia during the 1980s\u20131990s ultimately set as its goal the creation of its own state on Georgian territory, through the secession of a part of it. Such an objective of the Ossetian national movement had neither legal, nor historical, nor any other legitimate foundation or justification. From the very beginning, the Ossetian national movement assumed the essence and character of expansionism and expansionist nationalism.<\/h3>\nOssetian expansionist nationalism was reinforced by Russia\u2019s traditional imperialism, which continued to function within the newly established state, the Russian Federation. In Russia\u2019s hands, Ossetian expansionism served as a convenient instrument, directed against Georgia, which was striving for independence and sovereignty.<\/h3>\nAgainst this background, Georgian-Ossetian relations developed according to a scenario shaped during Shevardnadze\u2019s rule. It was precisely in the period shortly after Shevardnadze\u2019s arrival in Georgia that, on 29 May 1992, an act was adopted in Tskhinvali proclaiming the \u201cindependence of South Ossetia,\u201d and Georgia\u2019s new government found itself facing a new reality. This was soon followed, on 24 June 1992 in Dagomys (near Sochi), by a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze, where an agreement was signed on the principles of regulating the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.<\/h3>\nShevardnadze himself states in his memoirs: \u201cThe result of our meeting was an agreement on the principles of conflict regulation and a communiqu\u00e9, which declared that Georgia and Russia \u2018recognize each other\u2019s sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. They have no territorial claims against one another and undertake public commitments to resolve and regulate any disputes that may arise exclusively by peaceful means, through political negotiations, and to refrain from the use of force.\u2019\u201d<\/h3>\nThe agreement envisaged the following conditions: a ceasefire; the withdrawal of armed formations from the conflict zone; the creation of a Joint Control Commission; and the establishment of a group of military observers with the participation of the parties. It was later specified that the Joint Control Commission would serve as a permanent body involving the four parties in the process of conflict regulation. These included representatives of Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia, and \u201cSouth Ossetia.\u201d<\/h3>\nOf particular importance was the fact that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was included in the negotiation process. This organization attempted to move the negotiations from economic issues to political agreements\u2014taking into account Georgia\u2019s territorial integrity and the principle of the inviolability of its borders. Russia, however, sought to limit the role of the OSCE in this process.<\/h3>\nNevertheless, OSCE participation in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict negotiations produced certain temporary results. At the beginning of 2001, a resolution of the European Parliament noted that Abkhazia and \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d existed outside Georgia\u2019s de facto jurisdiction. Despite this, \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was evolving toward disintegration from Georgia. In April 2001, a constitution was adopted, according to which \u201cSouth Ossetia\u201d was defined as a sovereign state. This constitution granted it the right to join another state namely, the Russian Federation thus allowing Georgia\u2019s historical territory to be annexed to Russia.<\/h3>\nFor this reason, the Ossetian separatist movement and its drive toward independence were of an expansionist nature.<\/h3>\nUnfortunately, as always, no agreement with Russia has ever worked, nor can it ever work. Any agreement, sooner or later, ends in betrayal on Russia\u2019s part. The conflict remained frozen only until 2008. On 7 August 2008, however, Russia launched a war against Georgia.<\/h3>\nThe Georgian-Ossetian conflict of the 1990s clearly demonstrates the structural asymmetry between a small state striving for sovereignty and a regional power guided by imperialist traditions. Despite Georgia\u2019s attempts to halt the escalation through negotiations, peace agreements, and the involvement of international actors such as the OSCE, the process remained hostage to Russia\u2019s strategic interests. Moscow\u2019s consistent instrumentalization of separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia revealed that agreements were never designed to secure peace, but rather to freeze conflicts in ways advantageous to Russia. The temporary stability that emerged after the 1992 Dagomys Agreement only postponed a new wave of aggression, which culminated in the war of August 2008.<\/h3>\nFrom an analytical perspective, the case highlights two key lessons. First, peace agreements brokered without credible enforcement mechanisms and without genuine commitment from all sides cannot provide lasting stability. Second, Russia\u2019s use of separatist entities as geopolitical tools demonstrates the continuity of its expansionist policy, making any negotiated settlement inherently fragile. For Georgia, the experience underscored the necessity of broader international engagement and the risks of diplomatic isolation. Ultimately, the Georgian experience of the 1990s and 2000s remains a significant example of how unresolved conflicts, under the shadow of great power interference, can evolve into open war.<\/h3>\nTemur Sikharulidze<\/h3>\ntemosikharulidze43@gmail.com<\/h3>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, les services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sovi\u00e9tiques, puis russes, ont agi en Abkhazie et dans la r\u00e9gion de Tskhinvali de mani\u00e8re presque identique \u00e0 celle qu’ils ont adopt\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9gion du Donbass en Ukraine en 2014. Des s\u00e9paratistes locaux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mobilis\u00e9s et soutenus, et plus tard, leurs actions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":27,"featured_media":4080,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[17,1,16],"tags":[48],"class_list":["post-4071","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-histoire","category-non-classe","category-politique","tag-septembre-2025"],"yoast_head":"\n
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