\u00c0 la suite de la guerre froide, beaucoup pensaient qu\u2019un ordre international stable dirig\u00e9 par les \u00c9tats-Unis perdurerait. Pourtant, le monde appara\u00eet aujourd\u2019hui comme profond\u00e9ment boulevers\u00e9, marqu\u00e9 par la guerre en Europe et l\u2019ascension de puissances concurrentes. Des chercheurs de premier plan observent que si le syst\u00e8me domin\u00e9 par l\u2019Occident s\u2019\u00e9rode, un nouvel ordre \u00ab multipolaire \u00bb est en train d\u2019\u00e9merger, de plus en plus port\u00e9 par l\u2019Asie et le Sud global. Les craintes d\u2019un effondrement total de l\u2019ordre mondial se sont accrues, notamment \u00e0 mesure que les \u00c9tats-Unis se sont retir\u00e9s de leur r\u00f4le de leader traditionnel. Toutefois, cette transition est \u00e0 l\u2019\u0153uvre depuis des ann\u00e9es : elle n\u2019est pas uniquement le produit des \u00e9v\u00e9nements r\u00e9cents, m\u00eame si ceux-ci l\u2019ont acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e. Un facteur central r\u00e9side dans l\u2019h\u00e9sitation et l\u2019ind\u00e9cision des puissances occidentales face \u00e0 l\u2019agression autoritaire, ce qui a enhardi leurs rivaux et sap\u00e9 les principes de l\u2019\u00e8re post-guerre froide.<\/h3>\nUn exemple clair est le d\u00e9fi de longue date pos\u00e9 par la Russie \u00e0 l\u2019ordre post-sovi\u00e9tique. En 2008, la Russie a envahi la G\u00e9orgie, s\u2019emparant des r\u00e9gions d\u2019Abkhazie et d\u2019Oss\u00e9tie du Sud. Les r\u00e9actions occidentales se sont largement limit\u00e9es \u00e0 des protestations diplomatiques, sans action ferme visant \u00e0 inverser l\u2019invasion. Aujourd\u2019hui encore, la Russie occupe environ 20 % du territoire g\u00e9orgien, en violation flagrante du droit international. L\u2019absence de r\u00e9action occidentale d\u00e9cisive en G\u00e9orgie a envoy\u00e9 un signal dangereux. Celui-ci a \u00e9t\u00e9 renforc\u00e9 en 2014 lorsque la Russie a annex\u00e9 la Crim\u00e9e et attis\u00e9 la guerre dans l\u2019est de l\u2019Ukraine. Ces actions ont suscit\u00e9 des sanctions, mais aussi le maintien d\u2019une d\u00e9pendance europ\u00e9enne au commerce et \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9nergie russes.<\/h3>\nEntre 2018 et 2021, la part du gaz russe dans la demande de l\u2019UE est pass\u00e9e de 26 % en 2010 \u00e0 plus de 40 %. En 2021, la Russie fournissait environ 45 % du gaz import\u00e9 par l\u2019Europe et plus d\u2019un quart de son p\u00e9trole. Cette d\u00e9pendance a rendu plusieurs \u00c9tats europ\u00e9ens prudents face \u00e0 Moscou, m\u00eame apr\u00e8s des provocations \u00e9videntes. Des r\u00e9seaux d\u2019influence russes ont activement \u0153uvr\u00e9 \u00e0 approfondir cette d\u00e9pendance. Le Forum germano-russe a promu Nord Stream et combattu la diversification, tandis que des acteurs li\u00e9s au Kremlin pr\u00e9sentaient ces projets de pipelines comme des instruments de \u00ab dialogue \u00bb. L\u2019enchev\u00eatrement \u00e9conomique de l\u2019Europe avec la Russie a affaibli la volont\u00e9 politique pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment au moment o\u00f9 la dissuasion \u00e9tait la plus n\u00e9cessaire.<\/h3>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont culmin\u00e9 en 2021 et 2022. Alors m\u00eame que la Russie massait des troupes autour de l\u2019Ukraine, Moscou a formul\u00e9 des ultimatums maximalistes exigeant un retour de l\u2019OTAN \u00e0 sa posture des ann\u00e9es 1990 et un droit de veto sur tout futur \u00e9largissement. Ces exigences r\u00e9v\u00e9laient \u00e0 quel point le Kremlin se sentait enhardi. Lorsque la guerre \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle a \u00e9clat\u00e9 en f\u00e9vrier 2022, les cons\u00e9quences de l\u2019ind\u00e9cision pass\u00e9e sont apparues tragiquement \u00e9videntes. Le soutien occidental est arriv\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l\u2019invasion, non avant. Une dissuasion retard\u00e9e \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une dissuasion refus\u00e9e.<\/h3>\nLa guerre en Europe et le prix du retard<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019invasion russe de l\u2019Ukraine a bris\u00e9 la paix europ\u00e9enne et provoqu\u00e9 le plus grand conflit arm\u00e9 sur le continent depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. \u00c0 la fin de 2025, les estimations des services de renseignement occidentaux faisaient \u00e9tat de pr\u00e8s d\u2019un million de victimes des deux c\u00f4t\u00e9s, dont environ 240 000 soldats tu\u00e9s au combat. Les souffrances civiles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 immenses. Plus de 10,6 millions d\u2019Ukrainiens ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9plac\u00e9s, soit environ un quart de la population d\u2019avant-guerre. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, les forces russes occupaient encore pr\u00e8s de 19 % du territoire ukrainien.<\/h3>\n![\"Une](\"http:\/\/revuedestemps.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/une-image-contenant-texte-carte-atlas-monde-le-2.jpeg\")
<\/h3>\n
Part du territoire ukrainien occup\u00e9 et comparaison avec le territoire fran\u00e7ais (source\u00a0: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nChaque mois de retard dans la r\u00e9duction des revenus russes se traduit directement par des destructions suppl\u00e9mentaires. Les analystes avertissaient que chaque mois d\u2019h\u00e9sitation europ\u00e9enne signifiait davantage de missiles frappant les villes ukrainiennes. L\u2019\u00e9conomie ukrainienne s\u2019est contract\u00e9e de plus de 20 % depuis 2022, ses infrastructures ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9vast\u00e9es et des millions de vies ont \u00e9t\u00e9 durablement boulevers\u00e9es. Les r\u00e9ponses occidentales depuis 2022 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 substantielles mais r\u00e9actives. En 2024, les importations de gaz russe dans l\u2019UE ont fortement chut\u00e9 et les importations de p\u00e9trole ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9duites \u00e0 des niveaux marginaux. L\u2019OTAN a renforc\u00e9 son flanc oriental et acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 son \u00e9largissement.<\/h3>\nCependant, ces mesures sont intervenues apr\u00e8s la cr\u00e9ation de faits irr\u00e9versibles sur le terrain. Un soutien tardif ne peut effacer les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019ann\u00e9es d\u2019ind\u00e9cision. Le prix de l\u2019h\u00e9sitation se lit dans les villes d\u00e9truites et les g\u00e9n\u00e9rations perdues.<\/h3>\nLe Caucase et au-del\u00e0 : vides de pouvoir, connectivit\u00e9 et opportunisme<\/strong><\/h2>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont \u00e9galement remodel\u00e9 les p\u00e9riph\u00e9ries de l\u2019Europe, en particulier le Caucase du Sud, o\u00f9 la connectivit\u00e9, les infrastructures et les discours de paix fonctionnent comme des instruments de pouvoir plut\u00f4t que comme des biens neutres.<\/h3>\nLa trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n![\"Une](\"http:\/\/revuedestemps.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/une-image-contenant-texte-carte-atlas-monde-le-3.jpeg\")
<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Entre 2018 et 2021, la part du gaz russe dans la demande de l\u2019UE est pass\u00e9e de 26 % en 2010 \u00e0 plus de 40 %. En 2021, la Russie fournissait environ 45 % du gaz import\u00e9 par l\u2019Europe et plus d\u2019un quart de son p\u00e9trole. Cette d\u00e9pendance a rendu plusieurs \u00c9tats europ\u00e9ens prudents face \u00e0 Moscou, m\u00eame apr\u00e8s des provocations \u00e9videntes. Des r\u00e9seaux d\u2019influence russes ont activement \u0153uvr\u00e9 \u00e0 approfondir cette d\u00e9pendance. Le Forum germano-russe a promu Nord Stream et combattu la diversification, tandis que des acteurs li\u00e9s au Kremlin pr\u00e9sentaient ces projets de pipelines comme des instruments de \u00ab dialogue \u00bb. L\u2019enchev\u00eatrement \u00e9conomique de l\u2019Europe avec la Russie a affaibli la volont\u00e9 politique pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment au moment o\u00f9 la dissuasion \u00e9tait la plus n\u00e9cessaire.<\/h3>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont culmin\u00e9 en 2021 et 2022. Alors m\u00eame que la Russie massait des troupes autour de l\u2019Ukraine, Moscou a formul\u00e9 des ultimatums maximalistes exigeant un retour de l\u2019OTAN \u00e0 sa posture des ann\u00e9es 1990 et un droit de veto sur tout futur \u00e9largissement. Ces exigences r\u00e9v\u00e9laient \u00e0 quel point le Kremlin se sentait enhardi. Lorsque la guerre \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle a \u00e9clat\u00e9 en f\u00e9vrier 2022, les cons\u00e9quences de l\u2019ind\u00e9cision pass\u00e9e sont apparues tragiquement \u00e9videntes. Le soutien occidental est arriv\u00e9 apr\u00e8s l\u2019invasion, non avant. Une dissuasion retard\u00e9e \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une dissuasion refus\u00e9e.<\/h3>\nLa guerre en Europe et le prix du retard<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019invasion russe de l\u2019Ukraine a bris\u00e9 la paix europ\u00e9enne et provoqu\u00e9 le plus grand conflit arm\u00e9 sur le continent depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. \u00c0 la fin de 2025, les estimations des services de renseignement occidentaux faisaient \u00e9tat de pr\u00e8s d\u2019un million de victimes des deux c\u00f4t\u00e9s, dont environ 240 000 soldats tu\u00e9s au combat. Les souffrances civiles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 immenses. Plus de 10,6 millions d\u2019Ukrainiens ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9plac\u00e9s, soit environ un quart de la population d\u2019avant-guerre. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, les forces russes occupaient encore pr\u00e8s de 19 % du territoire ukrainien.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Part du territoire ukrainien occup\u00e9 et comparaison avec le territoire fran\u00e7ais (source\u00a0: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nChaque mois de retard dans la r\u00e9duction des revenus russes se traduit directement par des destructions suppl\u00e9mentaires. Les analystes avertissaient que chaque mois d\u2019h\u00e9sitation europ\u00e9enne signifiait davantage de missiles frappant les villes ukrainiennes. L\u2019\u00e9conomie ukrainienne s\u2019est contract\u00e9e de plus de 20 % depuis 2022, ses infrastructures ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9vast\u00e9es et des millions de vies ont \u00e9t\u00e9 durablement boulevers\u00e9es. Les r\u00e9ponses occidentales depuis 2022 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 substantielles mais r\u00e9actives. En 2024, les importations de gaz russe dans l\u2019UE ont fortement chut\u00e9 et les importations de p\u00e9trole ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9duites \u00e0 des niveaux marginaux. L\u2019OTAN a renforc\u00e9 son flanc oriental et acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 son \u00e9largissement.<\/h3>\nCependant, ces mesures sont intervenues apr\u00e8s la cr\u00e9ation de faits irr\u00e9versibles sur le terrain. Un soutien tardif ne peut effacer les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019ann\u00e9es d\u2019ind\u00e9cision. Le prix de l\u2019h\u00e9sitation se lit dans les villes d\u00e9truites et les g\u00e9n\u00e9rations perdues.<\/h3>\nLe Caucase et au-del\u00e0 : vides de pouvoir, connectivit\u00e9 et opportunisme<\/strong><\/h2>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont \u00e9galement remodel\u00e9 les p\u00e9riph\u00e9ries de l\u2019Europe, en particulier le Caucase du Sud, o\u00f9 la connectivit\u00e9, les infrastructures et les discours de paix fonctionnent comme des instruments de pouvoir plut\u00f4t que comme des biens neutres.<\/h3>\nLa trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
La guerre en Europe et le prix du retard<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019invasion russe de l\u2019Ukraine a bris\u00e9 la paix europ\u00e9enne et provoqu\u00e9 le plus grand conflit arm\u00e9 sur le continent depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. \u00c0 la fin de 2025, les estimations des services de renseignement occidentaux faisaient \u00e9tat de pr\u00e8s d\u2019un million de victimes des deux c\u00f4t\u00e9s, dont environ 240 000 soldats tu\u00e9s au combat. Les souffrances civiles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 immenses. Plus de 10,6 millions d\u2019Ukrainiens ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9plac\u00e9s, soit environ un quart de la population d\u2019avant-guerre. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, les forces russes occupaient encore pr\u00e8s de 19 % du territoire ukrainien.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Part du territoire ukrainien occup\u00e9 et comparaison avec le territoire fran\u00e7ais (source\u00a0: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nChaque mois de retard dans la r\u00e9duction des revenus russes se traduit directement par des destructions suppl\u00e9mentaires. Les analystes avertissaient que chaque mois d\u2019h\u00e9sitation europ\u00e9enne signifiait davantage de missiles frappant les villes ukrainiennes. L\u2019\u00e9conomie ukrainienne s\u2019est contract\u00e9e de plus de 20 % depuis 2022, ses infrastructures ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9vast\u00e9es et des millions de vies ont \u00e9t\u00e9 durablement boulevers\u00e9es. Les r\u00e9ponses occidentales depuis 2022 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 substantielles mais r\u00e9actives. En 2024, les importations de gaz russe dans l\u2019UE ont fortement chut\u00e9 et les importations de p\u00e9trole ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9duites \u00e0 des niveaux marginaux. L\u2019OTAN a renforc\u00e9 son flanc oriental et acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 son \u00e9largissement.<\/h3>\nCependant, ces mesures sont intervenues apr\u00e8s la cr\u00e9ation de faits irr\u00e9versibles sur le terrain. Un soutien tardif ne peut effacer les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019ann\u00e9es d\u2019ind\u00e9cision. Le prix de l\u2019h\u00e9sitation se lit dans les villes d\u00e9truites et les g\u00e9n\u00e9rations perdues.<\/h3>\nLe Caucase et au-del\u00e0 : vides de pouvoir, connectivit\u00e9 et opportunisme<\/strong><\/h2>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont \u00e9galement remodel\u00e9 les p\u00e9riph\u00e9ries de l\u2019Europe, en particulier le Caucase du Sud, o\u00f9 la connectivit\u00e9, les infrastructures et les discours de paix fonctionnent comme des instruments de pouvoir plut\u00f4t que comme des biens neutres.<\/h3>\nLa trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
<\/h3>\n
Chaque mois de retard dans la r\u00e9duction des revenus russes se traduit directement par des destructions suppl\u00e9mentaires. Les analystes avertissaient que chaque mois d\u2019h\u00e9sitation europ\u00e9enne signifiait davantage de missiles frappant les villes ukrainiennes. L\u2019\u00e9conomie ukrainienne s\u2019est contract\u00e9e de plus de 20 % depuis 2022, ses infrastructures ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9vast\u00e9es et des millions de vies ont \u00e9t\u00e9 durablement boulevers\u00e9es. Les r\u00e9ponses occidentales depuis 2022 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 substantielles mais r\u00e9actives. En 2024, les importations de gaz russe dans l\u2019UE ont fortement chut\u00e9 et les importations de p\u00e9trole ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9duites \u00e0 des niveaux marginaux. L\u2019OTAN a renforc\u00e9 son flanc oriental et acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9 son \u00e9largissement.<\/h3>\nCependant, ces mesures sont intervenues apr\u00e8s la cr\u00e9ation de faits irr\u00e9versibles sur le terrain. Un soutien tardif ne peut effacer les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019ann\u00e9es d\u2019ind\u00e9cision. Le prix de l\u2019h\u00e9sitation se lit dans les villes d\u00e9truites et les g\u00e9n\u00e9rations perdues.<\/h3>\nLe Caucase et au-del\u00e0 : vides de pouvoir, connectivit\u00e9 et opportunisme<\/strong><\/h2>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont \u00e9galement remodel\u00e9 les p\u00e9riph\u00e9ries de l\u2019Europe, en particulier le Caucase du Sud, o\u00f9 la connectivit\u00e9, les infrastructures et les discours de paix fonctionnent comme des instruments de pouvoir plut\u00f4t que comme des biens neutres.<\/h3>\nLa trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Le Caucase et au-del\u00e0 : vides de pouvoir, connectivit\u00e9 et opportunisme<\/strong><\/h2>\nLes h\u00e9sitations occidentales ont \u00e9galement remodel\u00e9 les p\u00e9riph\u00e9ries de l\u2019Europe, en particulier le Caucase du Sud, o\u00f9 la connectivit\u00e9, les infrastructures et les discours de paix fonctionnent comme des instruments de pouvoir plut\u00f4t que comme des biens neutres.<\/h3>\nLa trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
La trajectoire r\u00e9cente de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie est instructive. Tout au long de l\u2019ann\u00e9e 2025, le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian a visiblement recherch\u00e9 un rapprochement avec l\u2019Occident, se rendant \u00e0 Bruxelles pour des r\u00e9unions de haut niveau avec les dirigeants de l\u2019UE en juillet 2025 et visitant les \u00c9tats-Unis en septembre 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019occasion de l\u2019Assembl\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l\u2019ONU. Pourtant, cette ouverture n\u2019a pas emp\u00each\u00e9 un recentrage rapide vers Moscou. Le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a rencontr\u00e9 Vladimir Poutine \u00e0 Saint-P\u00e9tersbourg.<\/h3>\nPlus r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice encore que cette chor\u00e9graphie diplomatique a \u00e9t\u00e9 la volont\u00e9 explicite de l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie de se r\u00e9int\u00e9grer dans des syst\u00e8mes d\u2019infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie. En d\u00e9cembre 2025, Pachinian a publiquement appel\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 restaurer d\u2019urgence des segments ferroviaires d\u00e9saffect\u00e9s reliant l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie \u00e0 l\u2019enclave azerba\u00efdjanaise du Nakhitchevan et \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turque, notamment les sections de Yeraskh et d\u2019Akhurik. Ces discussions ont eu lieu directement dans le cadre de sa visite en Russie.<\/h3>\nLa signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
La signification g\u00e9opolitique est claire. Au moment m\u00eame o\u00f9 l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie cherche \u00e0 approfondir son engagement avec l\u2019UE et les \u00c9tats-Unis, elle signale sa disposition \u00e0 activer des routes qui contourneraient la G\u00e9orgie et r\u00e9duiraient la valeur pratique du r\u00f4le de corridor de cette derni\u00e8re. Il ne s\u2019agit pas simplement d\u2019une d\u00e9cision commerciale. Dans le Caucase du Sud, la connectivit\u00e9 d\u00e9termine le levier, et le levier d\u00e9termine le comportement.<\/h3>\nL\u2019approche de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan renforce cette logique instrumentale. Bakou traite de plus en plus les partenariats ext\u00e9rieurs et les arrangements de transit comme des outils de pression plut\u00f4t que comme des biens r\u00e9gionaux partag\u00e9s. Apr\u00e8s l\u2019adoption par l\u2019Arm\u00e9nie et l\u2019UE d\u2019un nouvel agenda strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 Bruxelles le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2025, le minist\u00e8re azerba\u00efdjanais des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res a protest\u00e9 publiquement, exigeant des r\u00e9visions de ce qu\u2019il a qualifi\u00e9 de \u00ab dispositions nuisibles \u00bb. L\u2019Arm\u00e9nie a rejet\u00e9 cette accusation. Ind\u00e9pendamment des r\u00e9cits, la tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale est \u00e9vidente : un document bilat\u00e9ral UE\u2013Arm\u00e9nie a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme n\u00e9cessitant l\u2019approbation de l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan au nom de la \u00ab paix r\u00e9gionale \u00bb.<\/h3>\nCela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Cela fait \u00e9cho \u00e0 des diff\u00e9rends ant\u00e9rieurs sur le transit et les tarifs, o\u00f9 des questions techniques sont rapidement politis\u00e9es, amplifi\u00e9es par des m\u00e9dias align\u00e9s et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme des tests de loyaut\u00e9 envers la stabilit\u00e9. La retenue de la G\u00e9orgie est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme allant de soi, tandis que d\u2019autres conservent la libert\u00e9 de contourner cet \u00e9tat de fait.<\/h3>\nLa G\u00e9orgie, l\u2019Ukraine et la contrainte strat\u00e9gique dans un syst\u00e8me international d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\nL\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
L\u2019approche de la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019Ukraine ne doit pas \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme ambigu\u00eb. Il est plus juste de la consid\u00e9rer comme coh\u00e9rente et fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e par un environnement r\u00e9gional difficile. Alors que certains \u00c9tats voisins oscillent entre des signaux pro-occidentaux et une d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des infrastructures contr\u00f4l\u00e9es par la Russie, la G\u00e9orgie a suivi une strat\u00e9gie mesur\u00e9e et coh\u00e9rente, fond\u00e9e sur la survie \u00e0 long terme.<\/h3>\nLes responsables g\u00e9orgiens soulignent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement leur situation s\u00e9curitaire non r\u00e9solue dans les forums internationaux. Lors d\u2019un sommet r\u00e9gional au Turkm\u00e9nistan, auquel assistait Vladimir Poutine, le Premier ministre g\u00e9orgien a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que la G\u00e9orgie soutenait la paix et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. Dans le m\u00eame temps, il a insist\u00e9 sur le fait que cette coop\u00e9ration reste limit\u00e9e par l\u2019occupation continue de territoires g\u00e9orgiens par la Russie et par les violations persistantes de l\u2019accord de cessez-le-feu de 2008.<\/h3>\nCette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Cette position, soutenir l\u2019Ukraine par des m\u00e9canismes juridiques et institutionnels tout en affirmant ouvertement l\u2019existence de son propre conflit non r\u00e9solu, refl\u00e8te une adaptation \u00e0 une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 structurelle. Elle ne traduit pas une ind\u00e9cision politique.<\/h3>\nDepuis des d\u00e9cennies, la G\u00e9orgie a pris de v\u00e9ritables risques pour maintenir la r\u00e9gion connect\u00e9e au monde ext\u00e9rieur. Elle a agi comme corridor de transit, espace de dialogue et, lorsque cela \u00e9tait possible, comme m\u00e9diateur. Ce r\u00f4le n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 facile ni s\u00fbr. Il a impliqu\u00e9 des pressions politiques, des risques s\u00e9curitaires et des co\u00fbts \u00e9conomiques. La m\u00eame retenue est visible au-del\u00e0 des infrastructures, notamment dans le domaine de l\u2019\u00e9ducation. La G\u00e9orgie a fait le choix d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 d\u2019enseigner l\u2019histoire r\u00e9gionale sans cr\u00e9er une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration qui per\u00e7oit ses voisins avec hostilit\u00e9. Les programmes scolaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9vis\u00e9s afin d\u2019\u00e9viter un langage inflammatoire. Dans certains cas, des actions g\u00eanantes de la part d\u2019\u00c9tats voisins sont minimis\u00e9es plut\u00f4t que utilis\u00e9es pour alimenter le ressentiment.<\/h3>\nL\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
L\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan est un partenaire important, en particulier dans le secteur de l\u2019\u00e9nergie. Toutefois, ce partenariat a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9ciproque et non unilat\u00e9ral. Des projets tels que l\u2019ol\u00e9oduc Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Ceyhan et la ligne ferroviaire Bakou\u2013Tbilissi\u2013Kars ne se sont pas r\u00e9alis\u00e9s automatiquement. Le r\u00f4le de la G\u00e9orgie a \u00e9t\u00e9 essentiel et s\u2019est accompagn\u00e9 de pressions politiques r\u00e9elles et de cons\u00e9quences concr\u00e8tes. Dans ce contexte, les critiques qualifiant les tarifs de transit g\u00e9orgiens, \u00e9gaux et fond\u00e9s sur des r\u00e8gles, d\u2019irrationnels ou d\u2019hostiles sont difficiles \u00e0 justifier. La pr\u00e9visibilit\u00e9 et la coh\u00e9rence sont normalement attendues d\u2019un pays de transit stable.<\/h3>\nDans ce cadre, la visibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective de la solidarit\u00e9 devient probl\u00e9matique. Les actions institutionnelles de la G\u00e9orgie attirent souvent peu l\u2019attention. Parall\u00e8lement, des acteurs r\u00e9gionaux plus bruyants sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme des partenaires pragmatiques, m\u00eame lorsqu\u2019ils approfondissent leur d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes contr\u00f4l\u00e9s par la Russie ou recourent \u00e0 des tactiques de pression. Cela fausse l\u2019analyse et cr\u00e9e des incitations in\u00e9gales. Avec le temps, ces incitations fa\u00e7onnent les comportements.<\/h3>\nCe sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Ce sch\u00e9ma est \u00e9galement visible dans la diplomatie r\u00e9cente de l\u2019UE. En 2025, Marta Kos s\u2019est rendue en Arm\u00e9nie et en Azerba\u00efdjan, mais pas en G\u00e9orgie. Cette d\u00e9cision a \u00e9t\u00e9 justifi\u00e9e par des inqui\u00e9tudes concernant un recul d\u00e9mocratique. Dans le m\u00eame temps, la visite incluait l\u2019Azerba\u00efdjan autoritaire.<\/h3>\nLe message \u00e9tait difficile \u00e0 ignorer : des pays riches en ressources, voire autoritaires, peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7us comme de meilleurs partenaires que ceux qui prennent des risques s\u00e9curitaires pour l\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 l\u2019UE et \u00e0 l\u2019OTAN. La volont\u00e9 euro-atlantique claire de la G\u00e9orgie s\u2019est heurt\u00e9e \u00e0 des pressions et \u00e0 des agressions qui sont souvent rest\u00e9es sans r\u00e9ponse. Ce sch\u00e9ma est ant\u00e9rieur au gouvernement actuel : il \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 visible \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque de Saakachvili, lorsque la G\u00e9orgie a fait face \u00e0 l\u2019agression russe tout en recevant peu d\u2019aide malgr\u00e9 sa position pro-occidentale. L\u2019h\u00e9sitation occidentale de l\u2019\u00e9poque montre que le probl\u00e8me ne tient pas seulement \u00e0 la politique int\u00e9rieure ou au recul d\u00e9mocratique, mais \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re dont les alli\u00e9s occidentaux \u00e9valuent le risque, l\u2019engagement et la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans un ordre international fragment\u00e9.<\/h3>\nFragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Fragmentation du front occidental et faiblesse structurelle de l\u2019UE<\/strong><\/h2>\nCes \u00e9volutions r\u00e9gionales refl\u00e8tent une fragmentation plus large au sein du camp occidental. La coh\u00e9sion transatlantique s\u2019est affaiblie, en particulier apr\u00e8s le retour de Donald Trump \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence des \u00c9tats-Unis en 2025. Son approche transactionnelle des alliances, ainsi que son attitude critique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard de l\u2019OTAN et de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne, ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 les capitales europ\u00e9ennes. Toutefois, ces signaux ne doivent pas \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9s uniquement comme anti-europ\u00e9ens. Ils t\u00e9moignent d\u2019une prise de conscience croissante \u00e0 Washington : les \u00c9tats-Unis ne peuvent pas soutenir ind\u00e9finiment des engagements s\u00e9curitaires sur tous les fronts.<\/h3>\nCette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Cette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 accro\u00eet la responsabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019Europe. \u00c0 mesure que l\u2019engagement am\u00e9ricain devient plus s\u00e9lectif, l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne doit \u00eatre en mesure d\u2019agir plus efficacement dans son propre voisinage. Ce d\u00e9fi est souvent masqu\u00e9 par des r\u00e9cits trompeurs, notamment l\u2019affirmation selon laquelle l\u2019UE aurait d\u00e9pass\u00e9 la Chine sur le plan \u00e9conomique. De telles comparaisons manquent l\u2019essentiel. L\u2019UE n\u2019est pas un acteur politique unifi\u00e9, mais une union contrainte par des droits de veto et une autorit\u00e9 fragment\u00e9e. La seule taille \u00e9conomique ne se traduit pas automatiquement par une puissance strat\u00e9gique.<\/h3>\nLes r\u00e8gles de l\u2019unanimit\u00e9 permettent m\u00eame \u00e0 des politiques cruciales d\u2019\u00eatre bloqu\u00e9es. Si l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 entre les \u00c9tats membres demeure une conqu\u00eate d\u00e9mocratique, l\u2019ind\u00e9cision persistante est devenue un handicap strat\u00e9gique. Une coordination renforc\u00e9e, des m\u00e9canismes de d\u00e9cision plus flexibles et des capacit\u00e9s de d\u00e9fense cr\u00e9dibles ne sont plus optionnels. Sans ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, l\u2019UE risque de rester \u00e9conomiquement importante, mais politiquement limit\u00e9e, dans un environnement international de plus en plus contest\u00e9.<\/h3>\nVers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Vers un nouvel \u00e9quilibre en dents de scie<\/strong><\/h2>\nLe d\u00e9sordre international actuel est le r\u00e9sultat cumulatif des h\u00e9sitations occidentales, d\u2019une solidarit\u00e9 s\u00e9lective et d\u2019une fragmentation interne, combin\u00e9es \u00e0 des strat\u00e9gies r\u00e9visionnistes affirm\u00e9es de la part des puissances autoritaires. De la G\u00e9orgie \u00e0 l\u2019Ukraine, du Haut-Karabakh au Sahel, l\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a invit\u00e9 la coercition.<\/h3>\nPourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Pourtant, le monde ne sombre pas dans le chaos. Il se reconfigure. Un syst\u00e8me multipolaire \u00e9merge, d\u00e9fini par des alignements fluides, des partenariats instrumentaux et une application s\u00e9lective des normes. La question de savoir si cela conduira \u00e0 un \u00e9quilibre plus stable d\u00e9pend largement de la capacit\u00e9 des d\u00e9mocraties occidentales, et de l\u2019Europe en particulier, \u00e0 surmonter l\u2019h\u00e9sitation, l\u2019incoh\u00e9rence interne et les distorsions analytiques.<\/h3>\nLa le\u00e7on des derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es est sans appel : l\u2019h\u00e9sitation a un co\u00fbt, elle se mesure en territoires perdus, en vies humaines et en normes bris\u00e9es.
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
Un ordre plus r\u00e9silient demeure possible, mais seulement si la coh\u00e9rence institutionnelle est reconnue comme une forme de solidarit\u00e9, et si la clart\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique remplace la politique symbolique dans un monde de plus en plus impitoyable.<\/h3>\n
\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili<\/h3>\nSources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\nArticle en anglais:<\/h3>\nThe Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\nHesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\nIn the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\nOne clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\nFrom 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\nWestern hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\nWar in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n<\/h3>\n
Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\nYet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\nThe Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\nWestern hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\nArmenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\nMore revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\nThe geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\nThis mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\nGeorgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\nGeorgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\nGeorgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\nThis position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\nFor decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\nAzerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\nIn this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\nThis pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\nThe message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\nFracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\nThese regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\nThis reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\nUnanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\nTowards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\nThe current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\nYet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\nThe lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\nA more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission, official data<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\nReuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n
\u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\nCouncil of Europe<\/p>\n
\u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n
NATO<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\nNATO, official documents<\/p>\n
\u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\nU.S. Department of State<\/p>\n
\u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\nUnited Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n
\u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\nUnited Nations<\/p>\n
\u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\nUNHCR<\/p>\n
\u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Commission<\/p>\n
\u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n
Reuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\nGovernment of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n
\u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\nEuropean Council<\/p>\n
\u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\nReuters<\/p>\n
\u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\nDefense One<\/p>\n
\u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\nAmitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n
\u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\nBrookings Institution<\/p>\n
\u00a0 \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Commission, official data<\/p>\n \u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\n International Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n \u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\n European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n \u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\n Council of Europe<\/p>\n \u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n \u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n NATO<\/p>\n \u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\n NATO, official documents<\/p>\n \u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\n U.S. Department of State<\/p>\n \u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n \u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\n United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n \u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Council<\/p>\n \u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\n European Commission<\/p>\n \u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations<\/p>\n \u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\n UNHCR<\/p>\n \u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\n European Commission<\/p>\n \u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\n Government of Georgia<\/p>\n \u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\n Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n \u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Council<\/p>\n \u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n Defense One<\/p>\n \u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\n Amitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n \u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\n Brookings Institution<\/p>\n \u2022 Brookings, Multipolarity and global disorder https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the- emergingmultipolar-world\/<\/a><\/p>\n Share of occupied Ukrainian territory and comparison with French territory (source: France Info).<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a01-Western Reliance on Russian Energy (Pre-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Commission, official data<\/p>\n \u2022 European Commission, EU energy supply and dependence on Russia https:\/\/energy.ec.europa.eu\/topics\/energy-security\/energysupply-and-dependence_en<\/a><\/p>\n International Energy Agency (IEA)<\/p>\n \u2022 IEA, How Europe can cut natural gas imports from Russia https:\/\/www.iea.org\/reports\/how-europe-can-cut-naturalgas-imports-from-russia<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters (data-driven, non-editorial)<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Europe\u2019s reliance on Russian gas before the Ukraine war https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/europesdependence-russian-gas-2022-02-24\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a02-Russia\u2019s Invasion of Georgia (2008) and Ongoing Occupation <\/strong><\/p>\n European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)<\/p>\n \u2022 EUMM Georgia, Background on the 2008 war and occupation https:\/\/www.eumm.eu\/en\/about_eumm\/background<\/a><\/p>\n Council of Europe<\/p>\n \u2022 Council of Europe, Human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/commissioner\/-\/georgiaabkhazia-and-south-ossetia<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a03-Crimea Annexation and Ukraine (2014 onward) <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations General Assembly<\/p>\n \u2022 UNGA Resolution 68\/262, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine https:\/\/documents.un.org\/doc\/undoc\/gen\/n14\/189\/78\/pdf\/ n1418978.pdf<\/p>\n NATO<\/p>\n \u2022 NATO, Russia\u2019s illegal annexation of Crimea https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_50090.htm<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a04-Russia\u2019s Ultimatums to NATO (2021) <\/strong><\/p>\n NATO, official documents<\/p>\n \u2022 NATO response to Russian security demands https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/news_191122.htm<\/a><\/p>\n U.S. Department of State<\/p>\n \u2022 Russian draft treaties and NATO response https:\/\/www.state.gov\/russian-draft-security-treaties\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a05-Ukraine War Human Cost and Displacement <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<\/p>\n \u2022 UNHCR, Ukraine refugee situation https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/ukraine-emergency<\/a><\/p>\n United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)<\/p>\n \u2022 OCHA, Ukraine humanitarian impact https:\/\/www.unocha.org\/ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Casualty and battlefield assessments https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/ukraine-warmilitary-casualties-explained-2024-02-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a06-EU Energy Break with Russia (Post-2022) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Council<\/p>\n \u2022 European Council, EU response to Russia\u2019s invasion, energy measures https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/policies\/eu-responseukraine-invasion\/energy\/<\/a><\/p>\n European Commission<\/p>\n \u2022 REPowerEU Plan https:\/\/commission.europa.eu\/strategy-and-policy\/ priorities-2019-2024\/european-green-deal\/repowereu_en<\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a07-Nagorno-Karabakh 2023 Offensive and Armenian Exodus <\/strong><\/p>\n United Nations<\/p>\n \u2022 UN OHCHR, Human rights situation in NagornoKarabakh https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/en\/press-releases\/2023\/09<\/a><\/p>\n UNHCR<\/p>\n \u2022 UNHCR, Armenians fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/news\/press-releases\/2023\/9<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan offensive and mass displacement https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/over-100000- armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh-2023-09-29\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a08-EU\u2013Azerbaijan Gas Deal <\/strong><\/p>\n European Commission<\/p>\n \u2022 EC press release on EU\u2013Azerbaijan energy partnership https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/ ip_22_4550<\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, EU signs gas deal with Azerbaijan https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/eu-signs-dealwith-azerbaijan-double-gas-imports-by-2027-2022-07-18\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a09-Georgia\u2019s Institutional Support for Ukraine <\/strong><\/p>\n Government of Georgia<\/p>\n \u2022 Official statements on Ukraine https:\/\/www.gov.ge\/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=589<\/a><\/p>\n Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia<\/p>\n \u2022 MFA statements on Russian aggression https:\/\/mfa.gov.ge\/en\/statements<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a010-Armenia\u2019s Western Outreach and Renewed Russia Engagement (2025) <\/strong><\/p>\n European Council<\/p>\n \u2022 EU\u2013Armenia meetings and strategic agenda https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/press\/press-releases\/<\/a><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Pashinyan meets Putin amid Western outreach https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/armenia-russiarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a011-Azerbaijan\u2019s Reaction to EU\u2013Armenia Alignment <\/strong><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Azerbaijan protests EU\u2013Armenia agreements https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/azerbaijan-eu-armeniarelations-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a012-Transatlantic Rift and Trump 2025 Context <\/strong><\/p>\n Reuters<\/p>\n \u2022 Reuters, Trump\u2019s stance on NATO and Europe https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-natoeurope-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n Defense One<\/p>\n \u2022 Defense One reporting on U.S. strategic debates https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0 \u00a013-Multiplex World Theory<\/strong><\/p>\n Amitav Acharya (Oxford University Press)<\/p>\n \u2022 Acharya, The End of American World Order https:\/\/global.oup.com\/academic\/product\/the-end-ofamerican-world-order-9781509507249<\/a><\/p>\n Brookings Institution<\/p>\n\u00a0<\/h3>\n
Article en anglais:<\/h3>\n
The Current International Disorder: Western Hesitation and Global Power Shifts Western <\/strong><\/h2>\n
Hesitation from Georgia to Ukraine <\/strong><\/h2>\n
In the aftermath of the Cold War, many assumed a stable U.S.-led international order would endure. Yet today we see a world in disarray, marked by war in Europe and the rise of competing powers. Prominent scholars observe that while the Western-led system is eroding, a new \u201cmultiplex\u201d order is emerging, led increasingly by Asia and the Global South. Fears of a complete collapse of world order have grown, especially as the United States retreats from its former leadership role. Even so, this transition has been unfolding for years, not solely caused by recent events, but accelerated by them. A key factor has been the hesitation and indecision of Western powers in the face of authoritarian aggression, which has emboldened rivals and undermined the principles of the post-Cold War era.<\/h3>\n
One clear example is Russia\u2019s long-standing challenge to the post-Soviet order. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, seizing the regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. Western responses were largely limited to diplomatic protests, and no robust action was taken to reverse the invasion. To this day, Russia occupies approximately 20 percent of Georgia\u2019s territory in blatant violation of international law. The lack of a decisive Western pushback in Georgia sent a dangerous signal. It was reinforced in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and fomented war in Eastern Ukraine. These moves were met by sanctions, but also by continued European reliance on Russian trade and energy.<\/h3>\n
From 2018 to 2021, Russia\u2019s share of EU gas demand had risen to over 40 percent, up from 26 percent in 2010. By 2021, Russia supplied roughly 45 percent of Europe\u2019s imported gas and over a quarter of its oil. Such dependence made key European states cautious in confronting Moscow even after clear provocations. Russian influence networks actively worked to deepen this dependency. The German Russian Forum promoted Nord Stream and opposed diversification, while Kremlin-linked actors framed pipeline projects as \u201cdialogue.\u201d Europe\u2019s economic entanglement with Russia blunted political resolve precisely when deterrence mattered most.<\/h3>\n
Western hesitation culminated in 2021 and 2022. Even as Russia massed troops around Ukraine, Moscow issued maximalist ultimatums demanding NATO retreat to its 1990s posture and a veto over future enlargement. These demands revealed how emboldened the Kremlin had become. When full-scale war erupted in February 2022, the consequences of earlier indecision became tragically clear. Western support arrived only after the invasion, not before it. Deterrence delayed proved deterrence denied.<\/h3>\n
War in Europe and the Price of Delay <\/strong><\/h2>\n
The Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe\u2019s peace and produced the largest armed conflict on the continent since World War II. By late 2025, Western intelligence estimates suggested nearly one million casualties on both sides, including around 240,000 soldiers killed in action. Civilian suffering has been immense. Over 10.6 million Ukrainians have been displaced, amounting to roughly one quarter of the country\u2019s pre-war population. As of December 2025, Russian forces still occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukraine\u2019s territory.<\/h3>\n
<\/h3>\nEach month of delay in cutting off Russian revenues translates directly into continued destruction. Analysts warned that every month of European hesitation meant more missiles hitting Ukrainian cities. Ukraine\u2019s economy has contracted by more than 20 percent since 2022, its infrastructure devastated, and millions of lives permanently altered. Western responses since 2022 have been substantial but reactive. By 2024, Russian gas imports to the EU fell sharply, and oil imports were reduced to marginal levels. NATO reinforced its eastern flank and accelerated enlargement.<\/h3>\n
Yet these steps came only after irreversible facts had been created on the ground. Support delivered late cannot undo the consequences of years of indecision. The price of hesitation is visible in destroyed cities and lost generations.<\/h3>\n
The Caucasus and Beyond: Power Vacuums, Connectivity, and Opportunism <\/strong><\/h2>\n
Western hesitation has also reshaped Europe\u2019s periphery, particularly the South Caucasus, where connectivity, infrastructure, and peace narratives function as instruments of power rather than neutral goods.<\/h3>\n
Armenia\u2019s recent trajectory is instructive. Throughout 2025, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visibly pursued Western engagement, travelling to Brussels for high-level meetings with EU leadership in July and visiting the United States in September in connection with the UN General Assembly. Yet this outreach did not prevent a rapid re-centring toward Moscow. On December 22, 2025, Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg.<\/h3>\n
More revealing than diplomatic choreography was Armenia\u2019s explicit willingness to reintegrate into Russian-controlled infrastructure systems. In December, Pashinyan publicly called on Russia to urgently restore disused railway segments connecting Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s Nakhchivan exclave and to the Turkish border, including the Yeraskh and Akhurik sections. These discussions took place directly in the context of his visit to Russia.<\/h3>\n
The geopolitical meaning is clear. At the very moment Armenia seeks deeper EU and U.S. engagement, it signals readiness to activate routes that would bypass Georgia and reduce the practical value of Georgia\u2019s corridor role. This is not merely a commercial decision. In the South Caucasus, connectivity determines leverage, and leverage determines behaviour.<\/h3>\n
Azerbaijan\u2019s approach reinforces this instrumental logic. Baku increasingly treats external partnerships and transit arrangements as tools of pressure rather than as shared regional assets. After Armenia and the EU adopted a new strategic agenda in Brussels on December 2, 2025, Azerbaijan\u2019s Foreign Ministry publicly objected, calling parts of the document \u201charmful\u201d and demanding changes. Armenia rejected these claims. Regardless of competing narratives, the broader pattern is evident: a bilateral EU\u2013Armenia document was framed as something that required Azerbaijani consent in the name of \u201cregional peace.\u201d<\/h3>\n
This mirrors earlier transit and tariff disputes, where technical issues are rapidly politicised, amplified through aligned media, and framed as tests of loyalty to stability. Georgia\u2019s restraint is treated as an expectation, while others retain freedom to escalate or bypass.<\/h3>\n
Georgia, Ukraine, and strategic constraint in a disordered international system<\/strong><\/h2>\n
Georgia\u2019s approach to Ukraine should not be seen as ambiguous. It is more accurate to see it as consistent and shaped by a difficult regional environment. While some neighbouring states shift between pro-Western signals and dependence on Russian-controlled infrastructure, Georgia has followed a restrained and coherent strategy based on long-term survival.<\/h3>\n
Georgian officials regularly underline their unresolved security situation in international forums. At a regional summit in Turkmenistan, attended by Vladimir Putin, the Georgian prime minister stated that Georgia supports peace and regional cooperation. At the same time, he stressed that such cooperation is limited by Russia\u2019s continued occupation of Georgian territory and by ongoing violations of the 2008 ceasefire agreement.<\/h3>\n
This position, supporting Ukraine through legal and institutional mechanisms while openly stating Georgia\u2019s own unresolved conflict, reflects adaptation to structural vulnerability. It does not reflect political indecision.<\/h3>\n
For decades, Georgia has taken real risks to keep the region connected to the outside world. It has acted as a transit corridor, a space for dialogue, and, when possible, a mediator. This role has never been easy or safe. It has involved political pressure, security risks, and economic costs. The same restraint is visible beyond infrastructure, including in education. Georgia has made a conscious choice to teach regional history without creating a new generation that views its neighbours with hostility. School curricula have been revised to avoid inflammatory language. In some cases, uncomfortable actions by neighbouring states are downplayed rather than used to fuel resentment.<\/h3>\n
Azerbaijan is an important partner, especially in the energy sector. However, this partnership has been mutual, not one-sided. Projects such as the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars railway did not happen automatically. Georgia\u2019s role was essential and came with real political pressure and consequences. Against this background, criticism of Georgia\u2019s equal and rules-based transit tariffs as irrational or hostile is difficult to justify. Predictability and consistency are normally expected from a stable transit country.<\/h3>\n
In this setting, selective visibility of solidarity becomes a problem. Georgia\u2019s institutional actions often attract little attention. At the same time, louder regional actors are presented as pragmatic partners, even when they deepen dependence on Russian-controlled systems or rely on pressure tactics. This distorts analysis and creates uneven incentives. Over time, those incentives shape behaviour.<\/h3>\n
This pattern is also visible in recent EU diplomacy. In 2025, Marta Kos visited Armenia and Azerbaijan but did not travel to Georgia. The decision was explained by concerns over democratic backsliding. At the same time, the visit included authoritarian Azerbaijan.<\/h3>\n
The message was hard to ignore, indicating that resource\u2013rich or even authoritarian countries can be seen as better partners than those taking security risks for EU and NATO membership. Georgia\u2019s clear Euro-Atlantic push has faced pressure and aggression, which often went unanswered. This pattern predates the current government, visible during Saakashvili\u2019s time when Georgia faced Russian aggression but received little help despite its pro-Western stance. Western hesitation then shows the issue isn\u2019t just domestic politics or democratic backsliding but how Western allies value risk, commitment, and vulnerability within a fragmented order.<\/h3>\n
Fracturing of the Western Front and the EU\u2019s Structural Weakness <\/strong><\/h2>\n
These regional developments reflect a wider fragmentation within the Western camp. Transatlantic cohesion has weakened, particularly after Donald Trump\u2019s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025. His transactional approach to alliances and critical stance toward NATO and the EU unsettled European capitals. These signals, however, should not be read simply as anti-European. They point to a growing recognition in Washington that the United States cannot sustain security commitments on every front indefinitely.<\/h3>\n
This reality places greater responsibility on Europe. As U.S. engagement becomes more selective, the European Union must be able to act more effectively in its own neighbourhood. That challenge is often obscured by misleading narratives, including claims that the EU has overtaken China economically. Such comparisons miss the core issue. The EU is not a unified political actor, but a union constrained by vetoes and fragmented authority. Economic size alone does not translate into strategic power.<\/h3>\n
Unanimity rules allow even critical policies to stall. While equality among member states remains a democratic achievement, persistent indecision has become a strategic liability. Stronger coordination, more flexible decision-making, and credible defence capabilities are no longer optional. Without them, the EU risks remaining economically significant but politically constrained in an increasingly contested international environment.<\/h3>\n
Towards a New Disordered Equilibrium <\/strong><\/h2>\n
The current international disorder is the cumulative result of Western hesitation, selective solidarity, and internal fragmentation, combined with assertive revisionist strategies by authoritarian powers. From Georgia to Ukraine, from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Sahel, ambiguity has invited coercion.<\/h3>\n
Yet the world is not collapsing into chaos. It is reconfiguring. A multiplex system is emerging, one defined by fluid alignments, instrumental partnerships, and selective norm enforcement. Whether this produces a more stable equilibrium depends largely on whether Western democracies, and Europe in particular, can overcome hesitation, internal incoherence, and analytical distortions.<\/h3>\n
The lesson of recent years is stark. Hesitation has a cost measured in territory, lives, and broken norms.<\/h3>\n
A more resilient order remains possible, but only if institutional consistency is recognised as solidarity, and if strategic clarity replaces symbolic politics in an increasingly unforgiving world.\u00a0<\/h3>\n
\u00a9 Giorgi Germesashvili\u00a0<\/h3>\n
<\/a>Sources:<\/em><\/strong><\/h3>\n